The combined cognitive bias hypothesis in depression by Everaert, Jonas et al.
Running head: COMBINED COGNITIVE BIAS HYPOTHESIS IN DEPRESSION  1 
 
 
 
The Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis in Depression:  
A State-of-the-art 
 
Jonas Everaerta, Ernst H.W. Kostera and Nazanin Derakshanb 
aGhent University, Belgium 
bBirkbeck University of London, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author: Jonas Everaert, Ghent University, Department of Experimental Clinical 
and Health Psychology, Henri Dunantlaan, 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium. Tel: +0032 09 264 94 42, 
fax: +0032 09 264 64 89, e-mail: jonas.everaert@ugent.be 
 
Ernst Koster, Ghent University, Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, 
Henri Dunantlaan, 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium. Tel: +0032 09 264 64 46, fax: +0032 09 264 64 
89, e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
Nazanin Derakhshan, Birkbeck University of London, Department of Psychological Sciences, 
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 20 7631 6538, fax: +44 20 7631 
6312, e-mail: n.derakhshan@bbk.ac.uk 
COMBINED COGNITIVE BIAS HYPOTHESIS IN DEPRESSION 2 
Abstract 
Drawing from substantial evidence demonstrating cognitive biases in depression at various 
stages of information processing (i.e., attention, interpretation, memory, cognitive control), 
we argue for an approach that considers the interplay among these processes. This paper 
attempts to apply the combined cognitive bias hypothesis (Hirsch, Mathews, & Clark, 2006) 
to depression research and reviews competing theoretical frameworks that have guided 
research in this area. We draw on current findings from behavioral studies on the interplay 
between depression-related processing biases. These data indicate that various cognitive 
biases are associated. However, it is not clear whether single or multiple biases are most 
predictive of depressive symptoms. We conclude this article with theoretical and clinical 
implications of the current state of research in this field and propose a number of ways in 
which research on the combined cognitive bias hypothesis can be advanced. 
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The Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis in Depression:  
A State-of-the-art 
Major depression is a prevalent psychiatric disorder that is associated with debilitating 
symptomatic suffering, functional impairments, and high societal costs (Kessler & Wang, 
2009). Notwithstanding a range of well-established psychological and pharmacological 
interventions, relapse and recurrence rates of depression remain high (Vittengl, Clark, Dunn, 
& Jarrett, 2007) indicating that current therapies do not sufficiently address vulnerability 
factors for this burdensome disorder. Moreover, with each successive depressive episode the 
risk for recurrence increases (Boland & Keller, 2009), which points to an expanding 
vulnerability with multiple episodes. Hence, profound insight into the mechanisms involved 
in the etiology and maintenance of major depression seems essential in improving 
contemporary treatment options and the prevention of depression. 
In the past three decades, research inspired by cognitive accounts of depression has 
been successful in identifying vulnerability factors for this disorder. Apart from substantial 
research examining depressive cognitive content as a vulnerability factor (e.g., negative 
thoughts), a promising line of research highlights the role of cognitive biases in the 
development, maintenance, and relapse/recurrence of depression (for reviews see Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Research efforts in this particular area of 
interest have typically focused on abnormalities in attention, interpretation, and memory 
processes, which are considered to be instrumental in the understanding of the processes 
involved in these cognitive biases. More recently, there is growing interest into cognitive and 
neural mechanisms underlying cognitive control impairments, which may operate across a 
variety of cognitive biases. Indeed a substantial number of studies on emotional information 
processing in depressed samples provide evidence that depression is characterized by 
attention, interpretation, and memory biases, especially for negative information (see below). 
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This research has been guided by comprehensive cognitive frameworks of depression (e.g., D. 
A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Ingram, 1984; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988, 1997) and findings have led to the development of specific cognitive science 
approaches to depression (e.g., Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009; Joormann, Yoon, & 
Zetsche, 2007). 
Cognitive Biases and Vulnerability for Depression 
What are, in broad terms, the findings on biased information processing in 
depression?1 A recent meta-analysis showed that depressed samples (i.e., encompassing 
dysphoric, clinically depressed, and remitted depressed individuals) exhibit an attention bias 
favoring negative information and also an absence of a positivity bias, compared with 
nondepressed samples (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Specifically, selective attention for 
negative information is characterized by impaired disengagement of attention from the 
processing of negative information rather than enhanced engagement with negative 
information (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). At the level of interpretation processes, dysphoric 
and depressed individuals display a tendency to interpret emotionally ambiguous information 
in a negative manner. Current findings suggest that ambiguity resolution is distorted in the 
effortful generation of interpretations and the selection of a single interpretation as most likely 
applicable to an ambiguous situation (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). Concerning memory 
processes, strong evidence exists that depression is marked by biases in explicit memory, with 
depressed individuals reporting overgeneral and more negative memories than specific and 
positive memories compared with nondepressed individuals (Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 
1992; Williams et al., 2007). In contrast, the data from studies examining mood-congruent 
implicit memory biases in depression is less conclusive (Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2004; P. C. 
Watkins, 2002). This bias might be observed only when there is a congruency between the 
depth of processing (e.g., perceptual, conceptual) at encoding and retrieval (Phillips, Hine, & 
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Thorsteinsson, 2010). Recent evidence points towards cognitive control impairments in 
depressed samples. In this respect, depressed individuals have shown difficulties in the 
inhibition of negative information (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Joormann, 
2004), as well as in the processes involved in shifting and the updating of emotional and non-
emotional representations in working memory (De Lissnyder et al., 2011; Lo & Allen, 2011). 
Importantly, longitudinal studies and cognitive bias modification (CBM) research (i.e., 
experimental manipulation of processing biases) have shown that cognitive control deficits 
(Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), biases in attention (Beevers & 
Carver, 2003; Wells & Beevers, 2010), interpretation (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, 
Lang, & Shah, 2009; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003; Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, 
& Whitney, 2002), and memory processes (Johnson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007; Raes, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2009; Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010) can predict and contribute to 
the onset and maintenance of depressive symptoms. Moreover, these distorted cognitive 
processes can be found in at-risk (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; 
Kujawa et al., 2011; Taylor & Ingram, 1999) and remitted (Fritzsche et al., 2010; Gilboa & 
Gotlib, 1997; Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007, 2010) depressed samples. 
Taken together, an accumulative wealth of data yield evidence for cognitive biases operating 
at various stages of information processing in depression and demonstrate that these distorted 
cognitive processes are not merely mood-dependent correlates of the disorder. 
Interrelations among Cognitive Biases 
A key limitation of current research is that cognitive biases in depression have been 
mostly studied in isolation, and at rather specific stages of information processing. While this 
approach has some advantage in enhancing our understanding of how a specific cognitive bias 
affects behavior, it is limited in that it does not inform on how cognitive biases are associated 
and linked to higher-order factors (such as negative schema’s, see below). Moreover, the 
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current focus on single biases provides a rather restricted understanding of the relative 
importance of how various biases may collectively influence the etiology and maintenance of 
depression. In other words, an integrated understanding of how cognitive biases act in concert 
can be achieved by investigating the interplay among biased attention, interpretation, and 
memory processes as well as cognitive control impairments. 
This review applies the combined cognitive bias hypothesis (Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006) to the study of depression. We attempt to frame how cognitive biases operate 
in concert and subsequently elaborate upon the main empirical questions arising from the 
combined cognitive hypothesis. We follow by discussing predictions from key theoretical 
frameworks that can inform upon the interplay among cognitive biases, guiding future 
research in this area. We draw upon empirical studies that have directly examined links 
between multiple cognitive biases. We conclude this article with theoretical and clinical 
implications of the current findings and propose a number of ways in which this new area of 
research can be taken forward.  
The Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis 
Although many cognitive (-behavioral) models of psychopathology assume that 
cognitive biases should work in concert, their take on this assumption has been relatively 
limited (see the section on theoretical frameworks). It is only recently that specific ideas and 
hypotheses regarding the interplay between distorted cognitive processes in emotional 
disorders have begun to emerge in experimental psychopathology research (e.g., Hertel, 
2004). In a paper focusing on bidirectional relations between interpretation biases and 
imagery, Hirsch et al. (2006) elaborated upon the notion of distorted cognitive processes 
working in concert and formulated the combined cognitive bias hypothesis (CCBH). It was 
argued that “cognitive biases do not operate in isolation, but rather can influence each other 
and/or can interact so that the impact of each on another variable is influenced by the other. 
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Via both these mechanisms we argue that combinations of biases have a greater impact on 
disorders than if individual cognitive processes acted in isolation” (p. 224). Although Hirsch 
and colleagues focused on cognitive processes in social anxiety disorder, the CCBH can 
equally be applied to other emotional disorders. 
The past years have seen an accumulative number of studies directly examining 
interrelations among cognitive biases in dysphoric and clinical depression (see the section on 
empirical data). As this research is still in its infancy, several questions that require further 
empirical investigation remain. We have identified three broad types of questions originating 
from the CCBH, namely association, causal, and predictive magnitude questions. Table 1 
provides a summary of the key issues within each type of questions. 
Association Questions 
The first type concerns what we refer to as “association questions”. These research 
questions address whether cognitive control impairments and biases at the levels of attention, 
interpretation, and memory are interrelated. Although several studies drawing from 
“association questions” (e.g., “are negative attention biases associated with enhanced memory 
for similar information?”) have been published (see the section on empirical data) many 
potential links have not been systematically explored. For example, no published research 
reports data on the association between biased attention and interpretation processes in 
depression, though influential cognitive models (e.g. Beck’s schema theory; see below) 
assume that there is a link. Clearly, findings from studies examining the “association 
questions” can provide a broad idea about various links among multiple distorted cognitive 
processes.  
Causal Questions 
Detailed insight into the functional interplay among cognitive biases is gained by 
studies that consider “causal questions”. Specific hypothesized causal relations among 
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different cognitive biases are the subject of this type of research questions. Two issues that 
deserve empirical consideration can be delineated. First, it is unclear whether multiple 
distorted cognitive processes operate in succession (i.e., unidirectional effects) with different 
processes influencing each other or, in contrast, operate in parallel without mutual influences. 
It could be, for instance, that an initial bias at encoding (e.g., attention bias) can influence 
subsequent biases (e.g., memory bias). Alternatively, these cognitive biases may operate 
simultaneously but independently from each other. In this instance, the extent to which 
cognitive biases are distorted may be influenced by other variables such as levels of 
depressive symptom severity.  
A second major idea within the type of the “causal questions” that has largely gone 
untested is whether there are reciprocal relations between different biases. For example, it 
may be that negative attention biases (e.g., a critical remark of a loved one) lead to negative 
interpretations of the attended material (e.g., “she/he does not love me anymore”). Negative 
interpretations can in turn enhance attention to similar material (e.g., other signs of 
disapproval) and refine or strengthen the depressed person’s interpretations (e.g., “he/she 
hates me”).  
In investigating the association and causal questions, it is important to consider 
whether the interplay among distorted cognitive processes has differential effects depending 
on the time course in depression severity (i.e., non-depressed at-risk, subclinical, clinical, and 
remitted depression). As we discuss later, the strength of processing abnormalities may 
partially depend on the level of depression severity, suggesting that the interplay between 
biased cognitive processes might not be static over time, but could change across stages and 
during the course of multiple depressive episodes. This warrants research scrutinizing 
association and causal questions in at-risk, currently, and remitted depressed samples. 
Predictive Magnitude Questions 
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While the first two types of questions concern mutual relations among information 
processing biases within specific situations (proximal timeframes), “predictive magnitude 
questions” address the influences of single versus multiple cognitive biases on the course of 
depression mainly using prospective research designs (distal timeframe). Specifically, 
additive versus interactive effects that may extend beyond the effects of isolated cognitive 
biases on depressive symptoms are considered. At present, it remains unclear whether 
depressive symptoms are exacerbated or maintained by single or multiple cognitive biases, 
and whether having multiple biases has additive effects on depressive symptoms. Moreover, it 
is also possible that certain interactions between biases have potentially strong effects on 
depressive symptoms. For instance, in some models of depression it is argued that self-
focused attention and memory bias are highly likely to have detrimental effects on depressed 
mood. Such questions are important in understanding the risk factors associated with 
depression, given that multiple vulnerability factors can increase the probability of developing 
a disorder, whereas an individual bias may not. That is, the predictive value of biases in 
isolation is often small to moderate and it could be that multiple cognitive biases and their 
interactive effects may have a stronger effect on the prediction of depression. 
As argued in the context of each type of questions, we propose that instead of merely 
examining biases in isolation, multiple cognitive biases need to be taken into consideration. 
Later in this article, we will review the state-of-the-art of empirical research for each type of 
CCBH questions. We consider first theoretical predictions on the CCBH in depression, as 
they are crucial to guide empirical research in this area. 
Cognitive Frameworks of Depression 
In several conceptual frameworks of depression, cognitive biases are considered 
important in the etiology and maintenance of depressive symptoms. Below we briefly 
describe the most influential cognitive frameworks with their shared and unique predictions 
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with respect to the different types of CCBH questions.2 Figure 1 depicts a schematic outline 
of the distinct cognitive frameworks.  
Beck’s Schema Model 
One of the earliest models that has attributed a critical role to cognitive biases is 
Beck’s schema theory (Beck, 2008; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). This theory states that 
depression-prone individuals hold negative schemata, which are dysfunctional mental 
representations about the self (i.e., on themes of personal loss, failure, or deprivation) and are 
developed in response to childhood experiences. When activated by stressful life events, 
negative schemata produce congruent biases in attention, interpretation, and memory for self-
relevant information. For instance, a student with a history of failing oral exams (e.g., schema 
of failure) may be more attentive for social cues of disapproval displayed in the nonverbal 
behavior of an examiner (e.g., frowned eyebrows) during new exams. The student may 
interpret such facial expressions as a sign of disapproval (e.g., “I must have given a stupid 
answer”) and recall negative memories about past failures (e.g., memories about the previous 
times failing an exam). Beck’s formulation with cognitive schemas biasing information 
processing implies that cognitive processes (and biases) can occur interactively and 
concurrently at the automatic and strategic levels of processing (p. 58, D. A. Clark et al., 
1999). This formulation is relevant for the “association questions” of the CCBH. Yet, the 
theory fails to provide a detailed account of testable predictions on causal relations among 
biased cognitive processes and it does not elaborate on interplay between automatic and 
strategic levels of information processing. Regarding differences in the interplay among 
different stadia of depression, the schema theory asserts that the magnitude of biases in 
attention, interpretation, and memory is a linear function of depressive symptom severity (pp. 
168, 179; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). It is hypothesized that, as depressive symptoms develop, a 
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cognitive shift occurs from a positivity bias to facilitate the processing of negative 
information in clinically depressed individuals.  
Whereas Beck’s cognitive model predicts biases at all levels (i.e., automatic, strategic 
processing levels) and facets (i.e., attention, interpretation, memory biases) of information 
processing, other cognitive theorists, such as Ingram (1984) and Williams, Watts, MacLeod, 
and Mathews (1988, 1997), have proposed a more specific account of cognitive biases in 
depression. These theories are discussed in turn.  
Enhanced Elaboration Accounts 
Ingram’s information processing analysis. Ingram (1984) attributes a crucial role to 
biased elaboration and memory in the maintenance of depression (association question). It is 
hypothesized that when depressive memory networks are activated by appraisals of life 
events, individuals elaborate extensively upon information that is congruent with the triggered 
negative cognitions. In keeping with the previous example, a student may appraise nonverbal 
cues, such as frowned eyebrows and crossed arms, as signs of failure (e.g., “my answer is not 
correct”) which may activate corresponding depression networks resulting in a thorough 
evaluation of the attributes and implications of the situation (e.g., “I did not understand the 
lessons that well, I will not pass the exam, I am stupid”). This selective processing style can 
activate connected memory networks by associative linkages. These networks may contain, 
for example, negative cognitions that are related to past feelings of depression (e.g., “I 
screwed up my romantic relationships, I am a loser”). Activation of such connected networks 
in turn maintains biased elaboration on negative material (causal question). As a result of this 
process of recycling of negative cognitions through various memory networks, the elaborated 
material is encoded more deeply into the depressive memory networks increasing the chances 
that this negative memory content becomes activated in the future. This biased elaboration-
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memory interaction heightens the vulnerability for depression and predicts future depressive 
episodes (predictive magnitude question). 
Williams et al.’s cognitive framework. In their influential 1988 (and revised 1997) 
framework, Williams et al. argued that depression is characterized by negative biases in 
elaboration and not in priming processes of attention and memory (association question). 
Priming refers to automatic processes involved in strengthening representations making them 
more accessible, while elaboration refers to strategic processes which form or strengthen 
relations between activated representations (Graf & Mandler, 1984). Two mechanisms are 
proposed that underlie these negative biases, namely the affective decision mechanism 
(ADM) and the resource allocation mechanism (RAM). When the valence of incoming 
information is considered as negative (e.g., frowned eyebrows in the previous example), as 
assessed by the ADM, more attention resources are allocated to negative material (e.g., the 
examiner rolling his eyes, crossed arms) leading to enhanced elaboration (RAM). The student 
might think, for example, “I must have given a wrong answer, he/she must think that I am 
stupid, I am not capable of succeeding for the course”. These depression-related elaborations 
are encoded into memory, enhancing later memory for depression-related material (causal 
question). Some predictions about the attention-memory interplay put forward in the 1988 
model were revised in 1997. Based on the empirical data available, Williams et al. concluded 
that depression is not featured by mood-congruent biases in attention (association question), 
thereby contradicting predictions made by Beck’s depression model (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). 
According to the reformulated model, depressed individuals engage in strategic or biased 
elaboration upon negative material during memory retrieval. This enhanced elaboration 
results in improved memory for similar information and, in addition, such elaborations can 
serve as mnemonic cues at later points in time (causal question). 
Impaired Cognitive Control Accounts 
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There is growing interest into the cognitive mechanisms that operate across biases at 
various levels of information processing. The idea of executive control as an overarching 
mechanism has been proposed by several researchers (e.g., Hertel, 1997; Joormann, Yoon, et 
al., 2007). Interestingly, Joormann et al.’s impaired cognitive control account (2007; 2010) 
specifies a causal pathway linking deficits in cognitive control to cognitive biases (causal 
question). The impaired cognitive control account asserts that depressed individuals have 
difficulties in limiting the access of irrelevant negative information into working memory 
(WM) and removing negative content that is no longer relevant from WM. For example, 
negative cognitions about past failures that remain active in WM (e.g., “I failed my previous 
exam, why would I pass now”) may interfere with the current performance on a task (e.g., 
when one is preparing for the next exam). It is hypothesized that such deficits in cognitive 
control underlie difficulties in disengaging attention from the processing of negative 
information. As a result, negative elaborations are stored into long-term memory, setting the 
stage for memory biases. Interestingly, whereas most cognitive frameworks predict schema-
congruent biases that are determined by a higher-order factor (i.e., cognitive schemata; D. A. 
Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984), Joormann et al. predict a cascade of biases that are driven 
by impaired cognitive control exerting an influence on attention and memory. It is clear that a 
different pattern of causal relations between cognitive processes is predicted by Joormann, 
Yoon, et al. (2007) compared with models of Beck (D. A. Clark et al., 1999), Ingram (1984) 
and Williams et al. (1988; 1997). 
Summary 
As discussed above cognitive theories differ in the extent they integrate multiple 
distorted aspects of information processing, elaborate on the interplay among such processes, 
and provide predictions regarding the possible ways in which cognitive biases can influence 
symptoms of depression in a collective manner. Thus, the CCBH can be applied to examine 
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the competing hypotheses arising from these different models. Yet, despite these meaningful 
core and differential predictions, the existing models are nevertheless ambiguous and 
underspecified as far as the dynamic interplay among cognitive biases is concerned. The 
sections below provide an overview of the current research reporting data informative about 
the CCBH.  
Empirical Data on Combined Cognitive Biases 
There are, as noted, an increasing number of studies investigating the interplay among 
attention, interpretation, and memory biases in depressed samples. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the published research to date.  
Association Questions  
An important line of studies testing associations between cognitive biases has focused 
on emotional biases in attention and explicit memory processes. A seminal study by Gotlib et 
al. (2004) explored the interplay between these processes in a sample of clinically depressed 
patients and never-disordered control individuals. All participants completed a self-referential 
encoding task in which the self-relevance of sad, angry, neutral, and happy words was 
evaluated, followed by an incidental free recall task to test memory for the presented words. 
Next, a dot probe task with emotional faces and an emotional Stroop task were administered. 
The dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) is a measure of spatial attention which 
presents emotional-neutral stimulus pairs followed by a probe at the spatial location of one of 
these stimuli. Reaction times to the probe allow the inference of whether attention was 
allocated to the neutral or the emotional stimulus. The emotional Stroop (Stroop, 1992) 
displays negative and neutral words written in different colors and participants are asked to 
name the color of each word. Naming latencies reflect the interference between color naming 
and attention allocated to the semantic content. Although depressed individuals showed an 
attention bias for sad faces in the dot probe task and recalled more negative and fewer positive 
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words, no significant correlations emerged between the different bias indices. No biases in 
attentional interference emerged on the emotional Stroop task. These findings suggest that 
even when attention and memory biases were both present in the same population, they were 
not associated. However, the lack of convergence between the attention bias indices suggests 
that the dot probe and emotional Stroop task may not be tapping into the same underlying 
attention processes. It is also likely that in this study, the absence of strong interrelations 
among the different bias indices could have been due to the error variance associated with 
information processing tasks or incongruence in the type of stimuli used in each task (i.e., 
facial expressions vs. verbal stimuli).  
Two recent studies in stable dysphoric samples provide some support for a relationship 
between biased attention and memory processes. A study by Koster, De Raedt, Leyman, and 
De Lissnyder (2010) investigated whether mood-congruent attention at different levels of 
elaboration is associated with memory biases. In a spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980) neutral 
and emotional cue words were presented in either the left or the right placeholder, and these 
were in turn followed by a target appearing in the same (i.e., valid trials) or opposite (i.e., 
invalid trials) placeholder as the emotional (or neutral) cue. By manipulating the cue target 
onset asynchrony (CTOA; i.e., the time between offset of cue and onset of target), it was 
possible to provide an index of the time course of attention on cue words. A subsequent 
incidental free recall task tested memory for the previously presented words. Results showed 
that dysphoric students demonstrated an attention bias for negative words only under 
conditions where the CTOA allowed for elaborate processing and, interestingly, this bias 
predicted the recall of negative words. Finally, this association remained significant even after 
controlling for the severity of depressive symptoms.  
Further evidence to indicate that cognitive biases in depression are related to each 
other was reported by Ellis, Beevers, and Wells (2011) using eye-tracking methods. 
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Dysphoric and nondysphoric participants completed a naturalistic visual scanning task 
(Eizenman et al., 2003) in which gaze behavior was monitored while viewing a series of 
slides depicting dysphoric, aversive, neutral, and positive words. This task was followed by an 
incidental recognition task for the displayed words. The dysphoric group exhibited an absence 
of a positive attention bias (indexed by the percentage of time fixating on positive stimuli), 
and this predicted less accurate recognition of previously presented positive words.  
Attentional breadth has also been studied in relation to explicit memory. For instance, 
Wells, Beevers, Robison, and Ellis (2010) presented dysphoric and nondysphoric 
undergraduates with a series of happy, sad, angry, and neutral facial expressions while 
recording their eye movements. An incidental recognition task assessed memory for the 
expressions. Analyses showed a broader attention focus for angry faces in dysphoric 
individuals compared with nondysphoric participants. This broader focus of attention was 
inferred from larger inter-fixation distances upon viewing the slides. The attentional breadth 
for angry faces was correlated with enhanced recognition for similar faces. 
In sum, the current pattern of findings suggests that in dysphoric samples emotional 
distortions in attention and memory are related to each other. However, there is no evidence 
supporting this association in clinically depressed samples. We now turn to discussing 
research findings on the association between memory and interpretation biases in relation to 
the causal questions. 
Causal Questions  
The effects of self-focused attention. Several theoretical frameworks (e.g., Beck’s 
cognitive model) have attributed a crucial role to attention towards self-relevant information 
in relation to other cognitive biases. To examine the effects of self-focused attention, studies 
have induced self-focus through thought-induction procedures (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993) which require participants to explore the meaning of a series of self-focused 
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and other-focused items (e.g., “my character and who I strive to be”, “the physical sensations 
in your body”). Two studies by Hertel and El-Messidi (2006) examined the effects of 
manipulating the focus of attention in relation to interpretation and memory biases. In the first 
experiment, focus of attention (self vs. other) was manipulated and participants completed an 
interpretation task in which they formed sentences with serially presented homographs (e.g., 
loaf, reflect). It was found that dysphoric individuals created more sentences revealing 
negative interpretations of the homographs in the self-focus than in the other-focus condition. 
The manipulation of attentional focus (self vs. other) did not directly affect the focus, namely 
personal vs. impersonal, of subsequently created sentences. However, there were significant 
correlations between negative and personal sentences. In a second study, participants were 
presented with homographs after the self-focus manipulation and their task was now to report 
the first words that came to mind. This was followed by an incidental free recall task testing 
memory for the homographs. Dysphoric individuals interpreted the homographs more often as 
personal and recalled more personally interpreted homographs in the self-focus than in the 
other-focus condition. Results of both studies suggest that heightened self-focused attention in 
dysphoric individuals may lead to more negative and personal interpretations of ambiguous 
information that may transfer to memory processes. 
In a related manner, a study manipulated the focus of attention in depressed patients to 
investigate the consequences for autobiographical memory specificity (E. Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004). Prior to the attention manipulation, participants were instructed to focus 
either on the experience described in each item (i.e. experiential condition) or on the causes 
and consequences of each item (i.e. analytical condition). An autobiographical memory test 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was administered before and after the attention focus 
manipulation. This memory test asks participants to produce a specific personal memory in 
response to positive and negative cue words. It was found that depressed patients engaging in 
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an experiential self-focus (which is considered as adaptive) recalled less overgeneral 
memories after the manipulation procedure. The overgeneral memories persisted in depressed 
patients engaging in an analytical self-focus (a pathological variant of self-focus). 
The findings of these studies collectively provide evidence for an association between 
attention, interpretation, and memory processes. It should be noted, however, that despite 
these interesting findings, inducing self-focus could influence other cognitive processes (e.g., 
self-critical thinking) that may have contributed to the results. 
Interpretation biases and explicit memory. Two published studies have examined 
how induced negative and positive interpretation bias affect memory in unselected samples. A 
study by Salemink, Hertel, and Mackintosh (2010) investigated whether memory for prior 
ambiguous events changed by subsequently established interpretation biases. First, 
participants were presented with (to-be-remembered) ambiguous social scenarios and asked to 
generate a least one ending for the story. Next, either a positive or a negative interpretation 
bias was induced. In short, such modification procedures induce interpretation biases by 
presenting participants with a series of ambiguous stories each ending with a word fragment 
for participants to complete. This word fragment imposes either a positive or negative 
meaning on the ambiguous story (for details see Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Upon 
completion, participants completed an incidental cued recall task to test memory for the initial 
scenarios and their endings. Results showed that the interpretation training affected memory 
for endings of prior ambiguous scenarios in a training-congruent manner, with positively 
trained participants remembering the endings of the stories as more positive than negatively 
trained participants. No training-group differences emerged in recall of initial scenarios.  
These results were extended by Tran, Hertel, and Joormann (2011). After a positive or 
negative interpretation bias training (procedure similar to Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), 
ambiguous stories ending with a to-be-completed word fragment were presented to the 
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participants (encoding phase). Different from the training scenarios, completion of the 
fragments in the encoding phase did not disambiguate the story in a positive or negative 
manner. Next, memory for these ambiguous scenarios was tested in a recall task. It was found 
that induced positive and negative interpretation biases resulted in corresponding positive and 
negative memory biases. Taken together, these findings suggest that emotionally biased 
interpretation processes influence memory for to-be-encountered as well as memory for 
previously encountered information. 
Predictive Magnitude Questions 
At present, there is, to the best of our knowledge, only one study published 
investigating the predictive magnitude of multiple cognitive biases in a single study. In a 
follow-up of the major depressed patients recruited by Gotlib et al. (2004), it was examined 
whether the biases observed in attention (measured by a dot probe task) and memory 
(assessed by an incidental free recall task) predicted the course of depression (Johnson et al., 
2007). Results showed that depressed patients who recalled a higher proportion of positive 
words at time one reported less severe symptoms nine months later. Furthermore, negative 
biases in neither attention nor memory related significantly to the change in depressive 
symptom severity. None of the cognitive biases predicted recovery from major depression. 
These findings suggest that even though different cognitive biases were present (i.e., attention 
and memory biases; cf. Gotlib et al., 2004), their effect on the prediction of depression was 
limited. Moreover, in the presence of multiple biases only some may have a predictive effect 
on depressive symptoms (e.g., memory biases), whereas others may not (e.g., attention 
biases). 
Summary 
The increasing number of studies on the interplay between cognitive biases has 
yielded some promising patterns of findings. First, there is evidence suggestive of significant 
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interrelations between depression-related biases in attention and explicit memory in dysphoric 
individuals (Ellis et al., 2011; Koster et al., 2010; Wells et al., 2010). In clinical depression, 
attention and memory biases may operate in isolation and differentially affect the course of 
depression (Gotlib et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2007). Second, induced self-focused attention 
affects interpretation biases in dsyphoria (experiment 1, Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006) and, 
moreover, analytical self-focus disturbs memory specificity in clinical depression (E. Watkins 
& Teasdale, 2004). Under conditions of heightened self-focus, distorted interpretations of 
ambiguous information transfer to memory (experiment 2, Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006). Third, 
acquired interpretation biases influence memory for past ambiguous information and memory 
for subsequently encountered information (Salemink et al., 2010; Tran et al., 2011). 
In spite of the evidence on the relationship between cognitive biases, no research to 
date has examined how the relationship between various cognitive biases may be influenced 
by impairments in cognitive control. Given that cognitive control is hypothesized to be an 
overarching construct that could account for the observed relationships between cognitive 
biases in depression (e.g., Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007), future research should investigate 
the modulating role of cognitive control impairments in relation to cognitive biases 
systematically. There is also a need to investigate the relationship between cognitive biases in 
a variety of samples, such as clinical or at-risk samples.  
Theoretical and Clinical Considerations 
Frameworks of Depression 
Theoretical implications of current findings. Information processing models of 
depression are expected to consider the possible interactions between cognitive biases as the 
current data in general provides support for interrelations among emotionally biased cognitive 
processes. Several implications can be discussed. As predicted by most cognitive models (D. 
A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984; Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988), 
COMBINED COGNITIVE BIAS HYPOTHESIS IN DEPRESSION 21 
current findings demonstrate interrelations among emotional distorted attention and congruent 
memory processes in samples of dysphoric individuals. More specifically, the reviewed data 
suggests that attention biases at later and not early processing stages are linked to congruent 
biases in explicit memory. These findings contradict predictions by Williams et al. (1997) that 
depression is not characterized by attention biases and are at odds with Beck’s claim that 
biases emerge also at automatic levels of information processing (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). 
In addition, the findings demonstrating that negative and positive interpretive biases 
are correlated with biases at the level of memory importantly suggest that biased information 
processing could contribute to the consolidation and elaboration of negative schema-content 
in memory (Ingram, 1984; Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988, 1997). 
However, it is not clear whether the elaborative processing of negative information can be 
attributed to the improved quality of encoding of negative information, as predicted by the 
enhanced elaboration accounts (Ingram, 1984; Williams et al., 1988), or to impairments in 
cognitive control, as predicted by Joormann, Yoon, et al. (2007). Taken together, biases in 
attention and interpretation may influence memory for emotional information, which is in line 
with the idea that cognitive biases maintain negative self-schemas in memory (D. A. Clark et 
al., 1999; Ingram, 1984). It is noteworthy that it is still unclear whether there are long-term 
influences of attention and interpretation on memory for emotional information. 
As noted earlier, current studies in support of associations among cognitive biases 
have been conducted in nonclinical dysphoric samples and findings from the only published 
study examining attention and memory biases in clinical depression showed results 
inconsistent with data generated in dysphoric samples (cf. Gotlib et al., 2004). Thus, the 
present state of the literature only allows us to draw conclusions about dysphoric samples. 
Gotlib et al. (2004) used different stimulus material across tasks which may have reduced the 
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likelihood to find associations. Clearly, however, more work in clinically depressed samples 
is needed. 
State vs. trait effects. As studies on the interplay between biased cognitive processes 
have been conducted in dysphoric and clinical depressed samples, it cannot be determined 
whether the observed interrelations are trait- or state-dependent effects of depression (i.e., 
cognitive schemata or mood). Although schema-congruent processing models of depression 
(D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984) pose a direct impact of schemas on cognitive biases 
there is also evidence for effects of mood on negative cognitions and cognitive biases. For 
instance, a study examining diurnal mood variation in relation to autobiographical memories 
(D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1982), found that depressed individuals were more likely to recall 
unhappy memories at times that are typically associated with more depressive complaints 
(e.g., mornings). This finding suggests that mood state effects are important in understanding 
the interplay between cognitive biases, as mood congruency effects might partially account 
for the observed interrelations between cognitive biases (besides trait factors such as cognitive 
schemas). 
To disentangle state and trait effects, the interplay among processing biases can be 
studied in remitted depressed samples. Interestingly, in this regard, different cognitive 
formulations of depression predict that cognitive biases emerge only under certain conditions 
in this population. Schema-models (e.g., D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984), for example, 
propose that after a depressive episode negative schemata remain latent but can be activated at 
any point in time by distressing situations (e.g., failing an exam). Consequently, remitted 
depressed individuals will not exhibit biases in attention, interpretation, and memory when 
not distressed. In contrast, the impaired cognitive control account (Joormann, Yoon, et al., 
2007) does not specify that negative mood state is required to find biases as it asserts that 
cognitive biases operate as long as the cognitive control impairments persist. As several 
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studies demonstrate cognitive control impairments in formerly depressed individuals (see 
Joormann, 2010), biases and their interplay should also emerge without negative mood states 
according to the impaired cognitive control account. Further study of cognitive biases in 
remitted depressed individuals with and without negative mood would allow testing the 
differential predictions from these cognitive models. 
Methodological considerations. A number of methodological issues seem relevant to 
the study of the combined cognitive bias hypothesis as introduced in this paper. The review of 
empirical studies on the combined cognitive biases demonstrate that present research has 
tested interrelations using primarily cross-sectional study designs that include only a limited 
set of cognitive processes, and have applied basic statistical techniques (e.g., correlational 
analysis) to analyze interrelations. Thorough examination of the CCBH requires statistical 
testing and modeling of direct and indirect links between multiple variables (e.g., cognitive 
biases) and constructs (e.g., negative schemata). This necessitates appropriate statistical 
methods. For example, structural equation modeling (Hoyle, 2012) can enable theory-driven 
tests of predictions using methods such as path analysis, structural regression models, and 
latent change models. Other data driven approaches (see Hsieh et al., 2011) allow for the 
investigation of interrelationships among multiple variables. Here information is obtained 
about the structure (i.e., associations among variables) and dynamics (i.e., clusters of 
variables) of the system in a stepwise manner starting from pairwise correlations among 
variables.  
Another issue concerns the reliability of the experimental tasks developed or modified 
to study emotionally biased aspects of information processing in depression (for overviews 
see Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Wenzel & Rubin, 2005). Remarkably, at 
present, data from studies examining psychometric properties are equivocally supportive for 
the reliability of experimental tasks used. For example, low split-half and test-retest 
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reliabilities as well as nonsignificant correlations between bias indices have been reported for 
different versions of the dot probe task (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Schmukle, 
2005). Furthermore, it has been observed that bias indices intended to measure the same 
construct often do not correlate with each other. Gotlib et al. (2004), for example, found 
correlations close to zero between attention bias towards sad faces in a dot probe task and 
emotional Stroop scores (see also Dalgleish et al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000). This finding 
raises doubts over the convergent validity of these measures (but see Salemink and van den 
Hout (2010) and Griffith et al. (in press) who managed to find acceptable psychometric 
properties of their tasks). Clearly further empirical work is needed in this area.  
A final issue that deserves consideration is the frequent medication use in the samples 
under investigation. Given that currently depressed participants in clinical studies often 
receive pharmacological treatment, effects of medication on mood and the interplay among 
cognitive biases needs to be taken into account. For instance, a study in a non-clinical sample 
observed that 7-days administration of citalopram, a selective reuptake inhibitor, produced 
enhanced memory for positive words (Browning et al., 2011). This illustrates that 
pharmacological interventions can have beneficial effects on cognitive biases, and possibly 
their interplay. As such, considering the influence of medication use is important.3 
Predicting Depression 
In the introduction of this article we argued that cognitive biases are not just an 
epiphenomenon of depression, but represent a vulnerability or latent endogenous process that 
is reactive to stress (Ingram & Siegle, 2009). Although empirical data from longitudinal 
studies have found that biases in attention (Beevers & Carver, 2003), interpretation (Rude, 
Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010; Rude et al., 2003; Rude et al., 2002), 
memory (Johnson et al., 2007; Sumner et al., 2010) and impairments in cognitive control 
(Zetsche & Joormann, 2011) can predict depressive symptoms and clinical depression, it is 
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notable that the obtained effects sizes are often small to moderate. In line with Mathews and 
MacLeod (2005) we believe that biased cognitive processes can have substantial effects on 
depression through their mutual interactions and interaction with stressful live events, 
affecting emotional reactivity to stress that may subsequently lead to depressive symptoms 
and episodes. Research on the combined influence of multiple cognitive biases on depressive 
symptoms is clearly still in its infancy. In this context, several broad issues should be taken 
into account, such as potential variations in the interplay between cognitive biases among 
stadia of the depression course, dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies through which 
multiple cognitive biases impact depressive symptoms, and biological vulnerability factors. 
These issues are discussed in turn. 
Variations in the interplay. In examining the predictive value of cognitive biases, 
potential differences in the interplay between biases among different stadia in the course of 
depression should be taken into consideration. It seems plausible that cognitive biases and the 
interplay among them will not remain static over time. For instance, the experience of 
becoming and being depressed (e.g., increasing sad affect, negative cognitions) might affect 
the magnitude of one or more cognitive biases (e.g., memory). One could expect, for example, 
that the interplay between these biases will be stronger as the number of depressive episodes 
increases (see Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Some research suggests that individual biases 
differ in function of depression severity. A study by Baert, De Raedt, and Koster (2010) 
directly compared the strength of attention biases in individuals reporting minimal, mild, and 
moderate to severe depressive symptoms. Results showed that maintained attention towards 
negative information was associated with moderate to severe depressive symptom levels. 
Moreover, it has been found that differences in cognitive control impairments depend on the 
depressed sample tested. Specifically, valence-specific deficits in cognitive control were 
observed in a dysphoric students sample (De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, In press), 
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whereas clinically depressed individuals showed only global cognitive control impairments 
(De Lissnyder et al., 2011). Taken together, future research will need to compare the interplay 
between cognitive biases across divergent samples corresponding with the stadia of the 
depression course (e.g., non/never-depressed at risk, clinically, and remitted depressed) to 
increase our understanding of cognitive vulnerability for depression. 
Emotion regulation strategies. The present research has generally focused on 
cognitive biases in relation to emotional reactivity and depressive symptoms (e.g., sustained 
negative affect). However, it remains unclear whether cognitive biases, and in particular their 
interplay, have direct effects on depressive symptoms or whether this relationship is mediated 
by other cognitive processes such as maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (e.g., 
rumination). In line with the latter view, it has been argued, for example, that cognitive 
control deficits underlie the reduced ability to use strategies (e.g., use positive 
autobiographical memories, reappraisal) to regulate sad mood in depression (e.g., De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Joormann & D'Avanzato, 2010). There is emerging research testing this 
hypothesis. For instance, prospective studies have observed that cognitive control 
impairments predict later depressive symptoms in non-clinical samples (Zetsche & Joormann, 
2011) and, in remitted depressed individuals, the relationship between cognitive control and 
depressive symptom levels is fully mediated by rumination (Demeyer, De Lissnyder, Koster, 
& De Raedt, 2012). In sum, the mechanisms by which cognitive biases and their interplay 
relate to emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms provide a fruitful avenue for 
future research. 
Biological vulnerability factors. Biased cognitive processes are expected to interact 
with genetic and neurobiological vulnerability factors (e.g., De Raedt & Koster, 2010). 
Genetic risk factors, such as variations in the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR), are 
associated with vulnerability for depression through their effects on social cognition 
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(Homberg & Lesch, 2011). More specifically, it is argued that genetic factors are associated 
with higher levels of vigilance for signs of social threat, which has been found both at the 
neurobiological levels (e.g., enhanced amygdala activity on presentation of fearful faces; 
Hariri et al., 2005) and cognition (Beevers, Gibb, McGeary, & Miller, 2007). In addition, 
genetic factors in interaction with stressors have been linked to reactivity in neural substrates 
(Caspi & Moffitt, 2006) with, interestingly, a correspondence between abnormalities at the 
neural system level and distortions in cognitive processes observed in depressed samples (De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010). For instance, it has been found that upon encountering negative 
material the increased activation in limbic regions (e.g., amygdala, hippocampus) is related to 
a reduced activity in specific regions in the prefrontal cortex (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex) with these latter structures being crucial 
to implement cognitive control over processing of affective material (Davidson et al., 2002; 
Whittle, Allen, Lubman, & Yucel, 2006). The emerging integrative (gene-by-environment) 
views on depression allow further exploration of the interplay among genes, neuroendocrine, 
and stress in relation to multiple cognitive biases (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011). 
Modification of Cognitive Biases 
Given the specific challenges in the treatment of depression, it is important to consider 
the current findings on the CCBH in light of therapeutic interventions for depression. Extant 
data showing associations among different aspects of depressogenic information processing 
may indicate that these biases in concert can play an important maintaining role in depressive 
complaints. In many psychological treatments of depression, a main aim is the modification of 
underlying negative schemas (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). However, when individuals are 
severely depressed, cognitive biases may hamper the effectiveness of verbal information 
transmission due to concentration, attention, and memory impairments. Moreover, emotion-
specific biases can strongly counteract therapeutic interventions as the encoding and 
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elaboration of information is strongly favored towards schema-congruent information (Baert, 
Koster, & De Raedt, 2011).  
CCBH and improving cognitive training. Given the maintaining role of information 
processing biases, it is important to consider the potential value of targeted cognitive training 
that can either train neural structures known to be impaired in depression (Siegle et al., 2007) 
or modify emotion specific biases in attention (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; 
Wells & Beevers, 2010), interpretation (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 
2009; Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2011) or memory (Joormann, Hertel, 
LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009; Raes et al., 2009). In general, cognitive bias modification (CBM) 
methodologies target specific cognitive processes by exposing participants to experimentally 
established contingencies during a task designed to encourage the acquisition or attenuation of 
an information processing bias (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). Notwithstanding promising 
findings, the number of CBM studies in depression needs to be extended and enlarged (see 
MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). At this point, further refinement of CBM procedures, and 
especially their implementation in clinical practice, can benefit from better insights gained 
through studies investigating the CCBH. If, for example, the impact of a certain cognitive bias 
on other biases and depressive symptoms differs depending on the depression phase, the 
preferred CBM intervention should be chosen accordingly. Moreover, depending on the 
precise interplay among cognitive biases in depression (e.g., unidirectional, bidirectional 
effects), the optimal training program might not only depend on the targeted aspect of 
information processing (i.e., attention, interpretation, memory, cognitive control) but also on 
the number of targeted cognitive biases. For instance, if various biases operate in a reciprocal 
manner, one might have to train multiple biases simultaneously to efficiently obtain clinically 
significant and enduring symptomatic improvement. In this regard, some promising findings 
were reported in a pilot study combining attention and interpretation bias training in clinical 
COMBINED COGNITIVE BIAS HYPOTHESIS IN DEPRESSION 29 
anxious outpatients (Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011). A reduction in 
attention and interpretation biases was observed together with a decrease in trait and state 
anxiety. Clearly, research on the CCBH provides promising implications for future CBM 
applications. 
As these training methodologies find their way to clinical practice, they will generally 
be combined with other approaches to modifying biases (e.g., pharmacological interventions). 
Note that different interventions may change biases for emotional information through distinct 
mechanisms (see Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010) and, moreover, may not always 
interact in the predicted way as is reflected by the outcome measures. For instance, a study 
examining effects of citalopram combined with attention bias modification in healthy 
participants, found that the combined interventions were less effective in inducing a positive 
bias than each individual intervention (Browning et al., 2011). This warrants specific research 
on the processes underlying training methodologies to optimize combinations of treatment 
strategies. 
CCBH and mechanisms underlying CBM. Providing inspiring directions for future 
research, Hertel and Mathews (2011) discuss the automatic and controlled processes involved 
in CBM procedures and correctly stress the relevance of learning principles (i.e., classical and 
operant conditioning) and memory research in understanding how cognitive bias training 
works. Besides clinical implications of knowledge about underlying processes of cognitive 
training, it is also of crucial importance for CCBH research to examine the precise 
mechanisms underlying CBM through training, as this is an important way to be as specific as 
possible in addressing the “causal question” of the CCBH. 
Conclusion 
In this review, we have argued for an approach that considers the interplay between 
cognitive biases. Based on empirical findings, we have shown that an association between 
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different depression-related cognitive biases. This indicates that the relations and effects of 
cognitive biases should be studied in a more integrative manner. The overview also showed 
that research on this topic is still in its infancy. Future research in this domain may be guided 
by the outlined types of unanswered questions originating from the CCBH and their 
integration with distinct cognitive frameworks of depression providing specific predictions on 
the interplay among cognitive biases. Arguably, our understanding of depression and thereby 
clinical practice will only benefit from scientific research that directly examines the links 
between biased cognitive processes identified in depression. With this review, we hope to 
stimulate future research on the CCBH in depression.  
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Footnotes 
1 The terms cognitive biases, distorted cognitive processes, and information processing 
biases are used interchangeably and denote biases in attention, interpretation, memory, and 
cognitive control processes. 
2 Note that this overview of cognitive frameworks is not exhaustive and presents only 
depression-specific models on cognitive biases that have guided empirical research on single 
cognitive biases in depressed samples.  
3 The discussion of potential influences of medication on the interplay among 
cognitive biases is beyond the scope of this review. 
Table 1 
CCBH Research Questions 
Type Key features 
Association questions Research questions concern whether cognitive control impairments, attention, 
interpretation and memory biases are associated. 
Causal questions Hypothesized causal relations among cognitive biases are of central interest. 
Research questions concern whether associated information processing biases 
operate in succession with unidirectional influences, in parallel without 
mutual influences, or in a reciprocal manner. 
Predictive magnitude 
questions 
Questions involve the effects of cognitive biases in concert vs. in isolation on 
the depression course. Addressing whether additive and/or interactive effects 
of cognitive biases on depressive symptoms extend beyond biases’ isolated 
effect is central to this type of questions. 
 
Table 2 
Empirical Studies on the CCBH 
Study Sample Findings 
Association questions 
Gotlib et al. (2004) Clinical depressed 
patients, never-disordered 
adults 
No significant correlations between observed 
attention and explicit memory biases 
Koster et al. (2010) Stable dysphoric and non-
dysphoric undergraduate 
students 
Negative attention bias at the later processing 
stages predicts recall of negative words in 
dysphoric students 
Ellis et al. (2011) Stable dysphoric and non-
dysphoric undergraduate 
students 
Absence of positive attention bias predicts less 
accurate recognition of positive words 
Wells et al. (2010) Stable dysphoric and non-
dysphoric undergraduate 
students 
Greater attentional breadth for angry stimuli 
predicts enhanced recognition of similar facial 
expressions 
Causal questions 
Hertel and El-Messidi 
(2006; experiment 1) 
Dysphoric and non-
dysphoric undergraduate 
students 
Dysphoric participants make more negative 
interpretations under increased self-focused 
attention 
Hertel and El-Messidi 
(2006; experiment 2) 
Dysphoric and non-
dysphoric undergraduate 
students 
Under heightened self-focused attention 
dysphoric individuals interpret more 
homographs as personal which are 
subsequently recalled to an increased extent 
E. Watkins and Teasdale 
(2004) 
Clinical depressed 
patients 
Overgeneral memories persisted under 
analytical self-focus, whereas non-analytical 
self-focus decreases overgeneral memories 
Table 2 
Continued 
Study Sample Findings 
Salemink et al. (2010) Unselected undergraduate 
students 
Established interpretation biases affect 
memory for previously encountered 
information. 
Tran et al. (2011) Unselected undergraduate 
students 
Established interpretation biases influence 
memory for subsequently encountered 
information. 
Predictive magnitude questions 
Johnson et al. (2007) Clinical depressed 
patients, never-disordered 
adults 
Number of recalled positive words predicts 
symptomatic change nine months later. 
Neither negative memory nor attention biases 
indices were related to changes in symptom 
severity. No bias indices predicted recovery 
from depression. 
 
(a) Beck’s schema model
(d) Impaired cognitive control
account (Joormann et al., 2007)
(c) Frameworks of Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod and Mathews
(b) Ingram’s information processing 
analysis
1988 model 1997 model
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Figure 1. Schematic Depiction of Interrelations Among Cognitive Biases According to 
Cognitive Frameworks of Depression.
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